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Bootstrapping an Environmental

Policy from an Economic Covenant:
The Teleological Approach of the

European Court of Justice
Kenneth M. Lord*
Introduction
In the European arena, the amount of effort and attention devoted to the
issue of environmental protection has increased dramatically over the past
twenty-five years.' While the public's desire to reduce transboundary pollution is a strong impetus for this increased political attention, 2 concern
regulation on trade
over the potentially deleterious effect of environmental
3
has also helped to force the issue into the limelight.
Although the pace has been slow, the general trend within the European Community (EC) is towards a harmonization of environmental regulations between the member states. 4 One of the primary reasons for this
movement is that the absence of a coordinated effort to deal with environmental issues could result in a fragmentation of the internal market. 5
Unfortunately, disparate levels of application and enforcement of EC environmental law by the member states is hindering the harmonization
effort. 6 The actions of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) will play a role
in determining whether the promise of a harmonized obligation to protect
Europe's natural environment will become a reality. Because the ECJ is
empowered to interpret treaties and resolve disputes, its role in this process
will be pivotal.
This Note presents analyses of the cases relating to the protection of
the environment that have come before the ECJ and the role that the court
* J.D. with Specialization in International Legal Affairs, Cornell Law School, 1996;
Ph.D., University of Florida, 1993; M.S., University of Florida, 1987; B.A., University of
Miami, 1983.
1. Ian B. Bird & Miguel A. Veiga-Pestana, European Community EnvironmentalPolicy
and Law, in EuRoPEAN COMMUNIrY LAW AFrRm 1992, at 219 (Ralph B. Folsom et al. eds.,
1993).
2. Id.
3. E.g., A. David Demiray, The Greening of Free Trade, 7 EMORY INT'L L. Rzv. 293,
293-96 (1993).
4. E.g., GEORGE A. BsmwAN FT AL, EuRoPEAN COMMUNITY LAw 1102 (1992).
5. Id.
6. Bird & Veiga-Pestana, supra note 1, at 220.
29 CoRNmu INT'L LJ. 571 (1996)

Cornell InternationalLaw Journal

Vol. 29

has played in the development of the EC's environmental program. Part I is
a brief overview of the European Community, including its evolution, political structure, and the sources from which its law arises. 7 Part II focuses
on the role and jurisprudence of the ECJ within the EC. Part III includes a
discussion of those treaty provisions that have particular relevance to the
issue of environmental protection. Part IV provides a chronological compendium of selected environmentally-relevant cases heard by the ECJ. This
compendium illustrates both the process by which the trade-based European Economic Community initially obtained competence over social matters and the evolution of the ECJ's approach with respect to the competing
interests of trade and environmental protection. In addition, it provides an
overview of the "common law" obligations relating to environmental protection presently in force in the Community. Part V of this Note addresses
more specifically the jurisprudence of the ECJ, as well as the court's roles
in the Community's acquisition of competence over environmental matters
and in the movement towards harmonization. It also provides a discussion
of the reasons why the court's efforts at harmonization have been only partially successful.
The primary purpose of this Note is to demonstrate the profound
effects of a principal underlying axiom of the EC-that European integration and the concomitant benefits of an internal market can only be realized through the harmonization of certain peripherally-related social
matters. Most significantly, this axiom provided the impetus by which the
judges of the ECJ have been able to manipulate their role as defenders of
the common market in order to promote the movement toward harmonization of environmental law within the Community.
I. Evolution of the European Community
In 1951, six European states signed a treaty in Paris for the purpose of
establishing an economic union known as the European Coal and Steel

Community (ECSC). 8 Six years later, the same countries signed two addi-

tional treaties in Rome. One created the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) which, it was hoped, would lead to the development of
sources of atomic energy and reduce the member state's dependence on
7. In 1993, the original title, "European Economic Community," was officially dis-

carded in favor of "European Community" (EC), a term which had, in practice, been in

use since 1986. The term "European Union" (EU) was also adopted in 1993 to refer to

new common policies introduced by the Treaty on European Union. See infra notes 7792 and accompanying text. The term "EC" remains valid for policy matters addressed by
the community treaties prior to 1993, while the term "EU" applies only in the context of
new common policies. E.g., Jens Rosenkvist & Laurent M. Campo, Recent Legal Developments of the European Community, 4 DuKuJ. COMP. & INT'L L. 189, 189-90 (1994).
8. Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, Apr. 18, 1951, 261
U.N.T.S. 140 [hereinafter ECSC], reprinted in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF EuRoPEAN COMMUNTY
Law pt. B2 (KR. Simmonds et al. eds., 1992). See also JOHN A. USHER, PLENDER AND
USHER's CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE Law OF THE EUROPEAN CoMMuNmES 1 (1993).
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imported energy sources.9 The other was the European Economic Community (EC) Treaty, also known as the Treaty of Rome. 10 The objectives of
the member states in forming the European Economic Community
included the elimination of trade barriers between member states and the
creation of a framework for the establishment of a stronger common
market. 1
In practice, the three communities are not and never have been completely independent of each other. 12 Since their formation, they have been
served by a single judiciary, the European Court of Justice, and by a single
legislature, the European Parliament. 13 In 1967, the member states
merged the previously-separate executive institutions of the communities
into a single Commission and a unified Council. 1 4 Since that time, the
political institutions established under the original EC Treaty have controlled the three communities.
The European Community is not simply a confederation of states subscribing to one set of economic treaties. 15 Rather, it represents a developmental stage in the move towards European unity and is more accurately
9. Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, Mar. 25, 1957,
298 U.N.T.S. 167 [hereinafter Euratom], reprintedin ENCYCLOPEDIA OF EUROPEAN CommuiNv LAW, supra note 8, pt. B5.

10. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298
U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter EC Treaty], reprintedin ENCYCLOPmIA OF EUROPEAN COMMUNrrY
LAw, supra note 8, pt. B10 (originally referred to as the "EEC Treaty").
11. D. LASOK

&J.W. BRIDGE, LAw AND INSTItuTONS OF THE EURoPEAN COMMUNrTIES

14-16 (1987). The six original states included the Federal Republic of Germany,
Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. Id. Denmark, Ireland, the
United Kingdom, Greece, Portugal, Spain, Austria, Finland, and Sweden have subsequently joined them. Richard C. Visek, Implementation and Enforcement of EC Environmental Law, 7 GEo. INT'L ENV'rL L. REv. 377, n.15 (1995). In the next few years,
Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia are also expected to join the EU. Id.
12. LASOK & BRIDGE, supra note 11, at 17-18.
13. Id. at 17. The European Parliament is comprised of 626 representatives who are
popularly elected by the citizens of the EU. EC TREATY, supra note 10, art. 137; Visek,
supra note 11, at 380. Initially, the Parliament only served an advisory role; however, in
recent years its power has been expanded to include the abilities to propose, amend, and
veto certain types of legislation. Id. The European Court of Justice functions as the
supreme judicial authority on matters of Community law. EC TREATY, supra note 10,
arts. 171-73. It is empowered to interpret the Community treaties, review the legality of
Community acts, consider possible breaches of Community law by the other Community institutions, answer questions of Community law from the member state's national

courts, and determine whether member states are fulfilling their Community obliga-

tions. Id. at 382-83.
14. Treaty Establishing a Single Council and a Single Commission of the European
Communities, Apr. 8, 1965, 4 I.L.M. 776 [hereinafter Merger Treaty]. The European
Commission, which consists of twenty-one commissioners appointed by individual
member states, serves a quasi-executive role. Vismc, supra note 11, at 381-82. The Commission bears the responsibility of drafting, implementing, and enforcing Community
law. Commissioners are expected to act in the general interests of the EU, rather than in
the interests of their own countries. The European Council, which consists of one representative from each member state, is the EU's primary legislative body, although it also
serves in an executive capacity with respect to the Community's general economic policies. Id. at 379. In contrast to commissioners, Council members act on instructions
from their respective governments. Id.
15. LAsoK & BRIDGE, supra note 11, at 29.
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described as a quasi-federal system, with the modified EC Treaty acting as
its constitution.- 6 A fundamental element of the system is that Community
law is binding on the member states, can be applied by both the member
states' national courts and the ECJ, and is often applicable to individuals
and corporations.' 78 Significantly, it also prevails over national law in the
event of a conflict.'

There are four sources of Community law.' 9 First, the member states
20
may create Community law in the form of treaties or similar agreements.
The most prevalent source of Community law is Community legislation,
which includes the regulations, directives, and decisions adopted by the
Council or the Commission. 2 ' "General principles of Community law"
constitute a third source. 2 2 These are collectively a form of common law
arising primarily from Community treaties and the legal systems of the
member states. 23 International agreements with non-member states constitute the final source of Community law. 24
II. The Role of the ECJ
The ECJ's primary function is to interpret and properly implement the treaties establishing the European Community in order to ensure that both the
member states and the branches of the Community government comply
with Community law. 25 It is also empowered with a number of subsidiary
functions, including the ability to hear challenges brought against the EC
by private persons affected by Community acts and the responsibility to
decide actions brought by member states, the Commission, or the Council
"on grounds of lack of competence, infringement of an essential proce26
dural requirement ...or misuse of powers."
16. Id. at 28-29. Although the legal systems of the Community and the individual
member states exercise a great deal of mutual influence over each other, they do not yet
constitute a unified and coherent legal system such that would define a federal state. Id.
17. T.C. HART, THE FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 10 (1994).
18. USHER, supra note 8, at 3.
19. HART=m-, supra note 17, at 96-97.

20. Id. at 98-106.
21. Id. at 107. Regulations are general statements of Community law that apply

directly to every member state and citizen of the EC. That is, they have a "direct effect"
upon EC citizens. Regulations are rarely used to address environmental concerns. EC
TREATY, supra note 10, art. 189. Directives, on the other hand, are the principal legislative tool of the Community. They mandate a result to be achieved by the member states,
but leave the mode of implementation up to the discretion of the individual state. Directives are commonly used for environmental matters. ClionaJ.M. Kimber, A Comparison
of Environmental Federalismin the United States and the European Union, 54 Mo. L. REv.
1658, 1675 (1995). Finally, decisions, or general rulings, are generally issued by the

Commission upon discovery of a violation of Community law. They only bind the party
at which they are aimed. See, e.g., Michael Scott Feeley & Peter M. Gilhuly, Green LawMaking: A Primer on the European Community's Environmental Legislative Process, 24
VAND.J. TRANSNAT'L L. 653, 667-68 (1991).
22. HARTIE, supra note 17, at 137.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 165.
25. EC TREATY, supra note 10, arts. 164, 171-73.
26. EC TREATY, supra note 10, art. 173.
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The ECJ may exert authority over other Community institutions
through four principal types of action. These include the action for annulment, the action for failure to act, the plea of illegality, and the action for
damages.2 7 Articles 173 and 174 of the EC Treaty provide for the action
for annulment and empower the court to declare Community acts void if
successfully challenged by qualified parties.2 8 Under article 175, the court
may address any action brought against either the Council or the Commission for a violation of the EC Treaty by omission.2 9 However, because the
ECJ tends to defer to the other branches when they properly exercise their
authority, these challenges are rarely successful.30 A defendant appearing
before the ECJ may challenge a Community regulation under which he is
being prosecuted by invoking the plea of illegality. 3 1 If the challenge is
successful, the regulation can no longer serve as the basis for the complaint, although it will not be annulled. 3 2 Finally, under the EC Treaty, the
ECJ may award monetary damages pursuant to successful claims of a non33
contractual nature against the Community.
The Court of First Instance (CFI)has been attached to the ECJ since
1989. 3 4 As its name suggests, the purpose of this court is to hear and
adjudicate certain types of actions first, subject to a right of appeal to the
ECJ on certain points of law. 35 These classes of action are dictated by the
Council. 3 6 When the CFI was established, the Council conferred it with
jurisdiction only over staff and competition cases, as well as coal and steel
cases arising from the ECSC Treaty. 3 7 In 1993, the Council extended the
jurisdiction of the CFI to include all direct actions brought by private parties against Community institutions.38 Although the CFI has had little
impact on Community environmental law, the Council is expected to
39
expand its role as the caseload of the ECJ continues to increase.
The EC Treaty did not explicitly grant a policy-making role to the ECJ.
Nevertheless, one of the ECJ's distinctive characteristics is that its decisionmaking is often founded on policy considerations. 40 There are three general policy objectives underlying the decisions of the judges of the ECJ:
strengthening the federal elements of the Community; increasing the scope
and effectiveness of Community law; and enlarging the powers of Commu27. USHER, supra note 8, at 89.
28. EC TREATY, supra note 10, arts. 173-74.
29. EC TREATY, supra note 10, art. 175.
30. BEAa
Er AL., supra note 4, at 114.
31. EC TR.AY, supra note 10, art. 184. The term "regulation," as used here and
throughout the remainder of this Note, refers to its plain meaning and not specifically to
official Community regulations, which are rarely used in EC environmental matters.
32. BmiA, Er AL., supra note 4, at 118.
33. EC TREATY, supra note 10, arts. 178 & 215.
34. UsHEu, supra note 8, at 43.
35. EC TREATY, supra note 10, art. 168a (as amended 1987).
36. Id.

37. BEAm,Err Al.., supra note 4, at 73.
38. Rosenkvist & Campo, supra note 7, at 191.

39. Id.
40. HARr'T.,

supra note 17, at 86.
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nity institutions. 41 In other words, the court's guiding tenet is the promotion of European integration. 4 2 Because it often uses such policy
considerations to fill gaps in Community law, the ECJ often functions in a
quasi-legislative capacity and has significantly contributed to the creation
of Community doctrine. 43
III.

The Community Treaties and Environmental Protection

A. Relevant Provisions of the EC Treaty
Several provisions of the original EC Treaty, although expressly concerned
with trade, have aided the establishment of Community competence over
environmental matters. 44 The development of an environmental program
pursuant to these provisions provides "an excellent example of how the EC
has grown to encompass areas not originally contemplated and how that
45
growth has been supported by the Court of Justice."
Article 30 is the free trade provision of the EC Treaty. It prohibits the
imposition of quantitative restrictions on imports by member states,
including any "measures having [an] equivalent effect." 46 It affects environmental regulations adopted by individual member states because such
47
If
regulations often have deleterious effects on intra-Community trade.
strictly enforced, article 30 would significantly hinder attempts by individual member states to protect the environment.
The EC Treaty, however, contains a public welfare exception to its free
trade requirement. Article 36 states that "[tihe provisions of articles 30 to
34 shall not preclude prohibitions or restrictions on imports . . . on
grounds of public morality, public policy or public security; the protection
of health and life of humans, animals or plants; the protection of national
48
treasures... ; or the protection of industrial and commercial property."
Nevertheless, article 36 explicitly forbids the use of such prohibitions or
restrictions as "disguised restriction[s] on trade." 49 Thus, article 36 allows
individual member states to promulgate environmental regulations under
certain circumstances despite an adverse "equivalent effect" on intra-Com50
munity trade.
Prior to 1987, articles 100 and 235 of the EC Treaty provided the basis
for Community-produced environmental regulations.5 1 Article 100 directs
the Council to issue directives for the purpose of harmonizing those laws
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Matthew L. Schemmel & Bas de Regt, The European Court of Justiceand the Environmental Protection Policy of the European Community, 17 B.C. INAr'& COMP. L. REv. 53,

54 (1994).
44. E.g., BEamA
45. Id. at 1101.

Er AL.,

supra note 4, at 1102.

46. EC TREA-Y, supra note 10, art. 30.

47.
48.
49.
50.

E.g., Demiray, supra note 3, at 294-95.
EC TREATY, supra note 10, art. 36.
Id.
See case and discussion infra notes 96-107 and accompanying text.

51. BEamANN
ar

AL.,

supra note 4, at 1102.
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of the member states that "affect the establishment or functioning of the
common market."5 2 This harmonization requirement has been used to
promote common policies in a number of fields that directly or incidentally affect the market, including social affairs, transportation, and environmental protection.5 3 Article 235, the implied powers or "elastic" provision
of the EC Treaty, is more general in scope but more restricted in application.5 4 It enables the Community to take actions not specifically provided
for in the Treaty, but only if necessary for the purpose of pursuing a stated
treaty objective.5 5 Both provisions require unanimous approval by the
56
Council for the passage of a directive.
Although the Community implemented its "First Action Programme
on the Environment" in 1973,57 it had not yet explicitly recognized environmental protection as an element affecting "the establishment or functioning" of the common market.5 8 As a consequence, the Council initially
promulgated environmental directives mainly under article 235, the
implied powers provision, and limited the use of article 100 in such matters.5 9 However, by the late 1970s, the member states had generally
accepted environmental regulation as being intrinsically related to the economic stability of the common market. 60 With this acceptance, the article
100 harmonization requirement came to be the primary justification for
these directives. 61
B. The Single European Act And The Adoption Of Environmental
Provisions
With the member state's adoption of the Single European Act (SEA) in
1987, the EC Treaty was amended to include several articles that explicitly
address environmental protection. 62 Article 130r proclaims the Community's environment-related objectives and lists some of the factors to be con52. EC TREATY, supra note 10, art. 100.
53. BEamNr Er AL., supra note 4, at 429.
54. EC TREATY, supra note 10, art. 235.
55. Id. See also HATLEY, supra note 17, at 111-19 (discussing the procedural limitations on the invocation of article 235).

56. Visek, supra note 11, at 386.
57. E.g., Julie A. Harms, Note, The European Community's Development of an Environmental Policy: The Treaty of European Union, 6 TutL E vrL. J. 397, 400-01 (1993).
There has since been a continuous sequence of such "Action Programmes," each lasting
from three to eight years. In these programs, the Community sets a series of specific
principles and objectives. Id. at 400-03. The Fifth Action Programme started in 1993
and extends until 2000. During this period, the EC plans to implement pollution reduc-

tion programs in five areas--industry, transport, energy, tourism, and agriculture-and
work toward solving certain environmental issues in developing countries. Id. at 40506.
58. EC TRaTY, supra note 10, art. 100.
59. BERmANN Er At., supra note 4, at 429.
60. See cases, infra notes 108-16, in which the ECJ found that environmental regulation by the EC is singularly justifiable under article 100.
61. Id.
62. See EC TREATY, supra note 10, Title VII (as amended 1987).
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sidered when preparing environmental initiatives. 63 Article 130s
64
establishes the procedure for adopting Community environmental rules.
The SEA maintained the requirement of unanimous Council approval,
which is perhaps the most significant procedural obstacle to the adoption
of such rules. 65 However, it also confers upon the Council the power to
unanimously decide that certain types of measures may be passed by a
qualified majority vote.6 6 The third provision, article 130t, grants member
states the authority to adopt more stringent protective measures than those
67
adopted by the Community.
The SEA added another provision to the EC Treaty, article 100a, which
provides an alternative legal foundation for environmental regulation by
the Community. 68 Like article 100, article 100a requires the harmonization of those laws of the member states that affect the functioning of the
internal market. 69 As a consequence, article 100a largely supplanted the
function of article 100. However, it also avoids some of article 100's
defects. 70 There are two significant differences between article 100 and
article 100a. First, article 100a eliminates the unanimity requirement and
allows the adoption of Community directives by a qualified majority vote of
the Council. 71 Second, article 100a makes the legislative process more
democratic by providing the European Parliament with a more active
72
role.
The partial elimination of the unanimity requirement represented a
significant step in the evolution of the Community's environmental policy.
The adoption of new directives is often a matter of dispute in the Council
and the unanimity requirement slowed the process considerably. 73 The
source of disagreement was usually economic, with less economically
developed countries tending to oppose strict environmental regulations
because of their cost of implementation.74 Thus, the option to use article
100a as the legal basis for the adoption of proposed Community environmental regulations significantly improves the likelihood of passage. The
EC Treaty places no restrictions on the use of articles, so the Council is
63. EC TR.T'Y, supra note 10, art. 130r (as amended 1987). Specifically, the article
lists the Community's objectives as the preservation, protection, and improvement of the
quality of the environment; making a contribution towards protecting public health; and

ensuring a "prudent and rational" utilization of natural resources. Some of the factors
deemed relevant to environmental regulation include the availability of scientific data,
the environmental conditions of the various regions of the Community, the potential
costs and benefits of action or inaction, and the economic and social development of the
Community as a whole. Id.
64. Id. art. 130s.
65. Id.

66. Id.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id. art. 130t.
Id. art. 100a.
Id.
BE~mANNe
Er A.., supra note 4, at 43-44.
EC TmrATY, supra note 10, art. 100a (as amended 1987).
Id. See also BaEmNN Er AL., supra note 4, at 439-40.
BEmtANuN Er AL., supra note 4, at 1102.
Id.
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free to utilize article 100a as the basis for environmental legislation as long
as Parliament participates in the approval process.
The adoption of the SEA demonstrated the Community's commitment
to environmental protection and broadened the Council's authority to promulgate environmental regulations. 75 However, the SEA's failure to
address the EC's role in implementing and enforcing those regulations has
differences between the member states
resulted in significant functional
76
over environmental matters.
The Treaty On European Union and the Enlargement of Community
Powers
the member states adopted the Treaty on European Union (TEU),
1993,
In
also commonly referred to as the Maastricht Treaty. 77 Like the Single
European Act, the TEU did not replace the three original treaties of the
European Community, but rather amended them to strengthen the Community. 78 Most significantly, the TEU superimposed the newly-formed
79
In the proEuropean Union on the EC's existing political framework
cess, it ushered in the next stage in the movement toward European unity
of member states 80
by conferring EU citizenship status on the nationals
81
and establishing a common Community currency.
The TEU implemented both substantive and procedural changes in
environmental policy. 82 Substantively, the TEU strengthened article 130r
by directing that environmental protection requirements "be integrated
into ... other Community policies."8 3 It also amended article 130s to provide financial support to member states that are unable to bear the costs of
implementing environmental measures. 8 4 Finally, it amended article 130s
to enable the Council to temporarily exempt particular member states from
the requirements of regulations when compliance would impose "costs
85
deemed disproportionate for the public authorities of a Member State."
These provisions were intended to encourage individual member states to
more amenable to
implement existing environmental directives and to be
86
the promulgation of new environmental regulations.
C.

75. Tamara R. Crockett & Cynthia B. Schultz, The Integrationof EnvironmentalPolicy

and the European Community: Recent Problems of Implementation and Enforcement, 29
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 169, 175 (1991).
76. Id. at 181-82.
77. Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, 31 LL.M. 247 [hereinafter TEU].
78. Rosenkvist & Campo, supra note 7, at 189-90.

79. Id.

80. TEU, supra note 77, art. 8. Union citizenship does not replace a person's

national citizenship, but merely supplements it.
81. TEU, supra note 77, art. 109e-m; HA~naE, supra note 17, at 8-9. The United
Kingdom and Denmark have refused to accede to the approval of a common currency
and are therefore not obligated to adopt the "European Currency Unit," or "ecu." Id.
82. Because it routinely takes several years for any given dispute to come before the
ECJ, the court has not yet heard an environmental case under the auspices of the TEU.
83. TEU, supra note 77, art. 130r.
84. TEU, supra note 77, art. 130s.
85. Id.
86. Visek, supra note 11, at 388.
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One of the more significant procedural changes was the amending of
articles 100a and 130s. These amendments made the process of adopting
new directives more democratic by enlarging the role of the popularlyelected European Parliament. With respect to article 100a legislation, Parliament was given the powers of co-decision, 8 7 allowing it to prevent the
passage of proposed regulations under certain circumstances. 8 8 For article 130s legislation, the requirement of unanimous passage by the Council
was largely eliminated and replaced with the cooperation procedure. 89
Under this procedure, only a qualified majority of the Council is necessary
to approve proposed regulations from the Commission.9 0 Approved proposals are then sent to Parliament, which can accept, amend, or reject
them. 91 If Parliament rejects a9 2proposed directive, the Council may only
adopt it by a unanimous vote.
Significantly, the TEU also created a procedure by which the ECJ may
93
impose fines on member states for failure to comply with its judgments.
This represents the first punitive mechanism by which the EC can actively
enforce its regulations in the face of obdurate behavior by a member state.
IV. Jurisprudence of the ECJ
Although the Council began promulgating directives concerning environmental protection in 1973, the Community's competence over such matters was not directly challenged before the ECJ until 1980. 9 4 However, the

court's holding in a slightly earlier case, Cassis de Dijon, was profoundly
influential and demands inclusion in this compendium. 95 There are two
types of cases presented herein. The first type of case was intended to
significantly influence human activities having a direct or indirect impact
on the biosphere. The second type include those, like Cassis de Dijon, that
examined or impacted the authority of the Community or the member
states to address environmental matters.
A. The Establishment of Competence-1979-1980
1. Cassis de Dijon (1979)
In the landmark Cassis de Dijon case, the ECJ established a balancing test
subsequently used to analyze disputes arising from the omnipresent ten87. TEU, supra note 77, art. 100a.
88. TEU, supra note 77, art. 189b. The co-decision procedure is fairly complex. Its

purpose is to incorporate and balance the views of all three legislative branches into
each final decision, with the possibility of using a "Conciliation Committee" to resolve

disagreements between the branches. Id.
89. TEU, supra note 77, art. 130s.
90. TEU, supra note 77, art. 189c.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. TEU, supra note 77, art. 171.
94. See Detergents and Sulphur Content of Fuels, infra notes 108-16 and accompanying text.
95. Case 120/78, Rewe-Zentral AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung Fir Branntwein,
1979 E.C.R. 649 [hereinafter Cassis de Dijon].
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sion between economic maximization and public welfare, including environmental protection. 9 6 One of the primary arguments in Cassis de Dijon
focused on the article 36 public health exception to the EC Treaty prohibition against restrictions on the free movement of goods between member
states.9 7 The ECJ required that each member state give effect to the others'
national laws by marketing goods lawfully marketed elsewhere in the Community, unless a national marketing restriction is necessary to safeguard
"mandatory requirements" such as the public health. 98 To determine
whether the mandatory requirement exception applied, the ECJ formulated
the "rule of reason" test, in which it weighs the goals of a member state's
regulation or a Council directive against its impact on trade before rendering a decision.9 9 The ECJ has since used the "rule of reason" approach
when balancing public welfare concerns against the economic policies of
the Community. 10 0
Cassis de Dijon arose in 1979 after the Federal Republic of Germany
had mandated a minimum alcohol content of 25% for fruit liqueurs and
prohibited the importation or sale of alcoholic beverages that fell below
this minimum.10 1 The dispute was referred to the ECJ when importers of
the French-manufactured Cassis de Dijon liqueur challenged the restriction
as violative of article 30, which guarantees the free movement of goods
02
between Community members.'
Germany forwarded two defenses. The first was that the restriction
was necessary to protect the public health, and thus permissible under article 36, because lower-proof beverages purportedly foster a tolerance
03
towards alcohol more easily than those with a higher alcohol content.'
The second defense was that the producers of lower proof beverages gain
because these products are subject to a
an unfair competitive advantage
10 4
proportionally lower tax rate.
Neither defense persuaded the ECJ. It considered the health argument
to be unjustified because much of the higher proof alcohol sold in Germany is diluted prior to consumption.' 0 5 Furthermore, it felt that any market advantage gained by the manufacturers of low proof beverages could be
overcome by less burdensome means, such as a requirement that alcohol
percentages be dearly displayed for the consumer. 10 6 Applying the "rule
96. See supranotes 46-50 and accompanying text for a discussion of article 30 et seq.
97. Cassis de Dijon, 1979 E.C.R. at 662-63.
98. Id. These "mandatory requirements" include "the effectiveness of fiscal supervision, the protection of public health, the fairness of commercial transactions and the

defence of the consumer." Id.
99. Id. at 664.
100. See, e.g., Waste Oils I, II, III, infra notes 130-49 and accompanying text. In these
cases, the court broadened the "rule of reason" approach to apply in environmental pro-

tection cases as well. Id.
101. Cassis de Dijon, 1979 E.C.R. at 660.
102. Id. at 661.

103. Id. at 662-63.
104. Id. at 663.
105. Id.

106. Id. at 664.
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of reason" test, the court held that the German government's concerns
failed to outweigh the prohibition's negative impact on the free movement
10 7
of goods.
2. Italy Detergents'0 8/Sulphur Content of Fuels'0 9 (1980)
The first direct challenge to the EC's jurisdiction over environmental matters came in 1980, after the Italian government failed to comply with two
Council directives-one requiring all detergents to be biodegradable 1 0 and
another fixing a maximum allowable sulphur content for liquid fuels."'
The ECJ consolidated and decided these cases on the same day. Although
the Italian government claimed not to be disputing the validity of the directhe Community's authority to issue such
tives, in each case it questioned
12
environmental regulations.
The ECJ rejected the Italian government's argument on multiple
grounds. First, the court concluded that the directives had two purposesprotection of the environment and the elimination of trade barriers
between member states resulting from dissimilar regulations. 113 On this
latter ground, the court found both directives valid per se under article 100
of the EC Treaty. 114 Perhaps more significantly, the ECJ found that environmental provisions by the EC are singularly justifiable under article 100.
The court reasoned that in the absence of harmonized Community environmental regulations, fair market competition between the member states
115
might be "appreciably distorted."
The holdings in these cases were critical for two reasons. First, they
unequivocally established the EC's authority to regulate environmental
matters within the Community. Second, they established this authority
regulaunder article 100, which empowered the Council to adopt such1 16
tions, but only upon a unanimous vote by the Council Members.
B. Fixing Policy and Extending the Community's Jurisdiction-1981 to
the Present
1. Plant Protection Products (1981)

117

Following the ECJ's adoption of a balancing approach in Cassis de Duon, it
was unclear when member states could invoke the public welfare exception
107. Id.
108. Case 91/79, Commission v. Italy, 1980 E.C.R. 1099 [hereinafter Detergents].
109. Case 92/79, Commission v. Italy, 1980 E.C.R. 1115 [hereinafter Sulphur Content

of Fuels].
110.
111.
112.
113.

Detergents, 1980 E.C.R. at 1101.
Sulphur Content of Fuels, 1980 E.C.R. at 1117.
Detergents, 1980 E.C.R. at 1103; Sulphur Content of Fuels, 1980 E.C.R. at 1119.
Detergents, 1980 E.C.R. at 1106; Sulphur Content of Fuels, 1980 E.C.R. at 1122.

114. Detergents, 1980 E.C.R. at 1106; Sulphur Content of Fuels, 1980 E.C.R. at 1122.
115. Detergents, 1980 E.C.R. at 1106; Sulphur Content of Fuels, 1980 E.C.R. at 1122.
116. EC TRATY, supra note 10, art. 100.

117. Case 272/80, Crim. Proc. Against Frans-Nederlandse Maatschappij Voor
Biologische Producten B.V., 1981 E.C.R. 3277 [hereinafter Plant Protection Products].
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of article 36 to restrict intra-Community trade.' 18 However, the court's
subsequent holding in the Plant ProtectionProducts case demonstrated that
the effectiveness of article 36 had not been undermined.
The dispute began in 1979 when a private Dutch company, FransNederlandse Maatschappij Voor Biologische Producten B.V., was fined by a
Dutch court for selling and delivering a plant protection product not yet
approved for use in the Netherlands. 119 The company appealed the sentence, arguing that because the same product had been tested, found to be
safe and approved for use in France, the EC Treaty prevented the Netherlands from prohibiting its use on public health grounds.' 20 The Dutch
court referred the issue to the ECJ.
The ECJ held that, in the absence of a specific Community rule to the
contrary, a member state could require approval of a product for the purpose of protecting the public health, even if it had been previously
approved by another member state.1 2 1 However, in order to reduce the
impact on the free movement of goods, the ECJ prohibited authorities in an
importing state from unnecessarily requiring the duplication of tests
12 2
already conducted in another member state.
2. Italy Directives (1981)

12 3

Approximately one and one-half years after the Detergents and Sulphur
Content of Fuels cases, the Italian government again appeared before the
ECJ for failing to comply with Council directives concerning the protection
of the environment. 124 In this instance, directives concerning waste oils
disposal, drinking water quality, waste disposal, bathing water quality, and
polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) and polychlorinated terphenyls (PCTs)
disposal were involved. 125 The cases were joined for the purposes of the
court.
This time, the Italian government neither questioned the EC's authority over environmental matters nor disputed that it had failed to fulfill its
obligations. 12 6 Rather, it pleaded that the implementation of the directives
had simply been delayed because of complications inherent in Italy's parliamentary process. 127 The ECJ rejected this defense, stating that "a Member State may not plead provisions, practices or circumstances existing in
its internal legal system in order to justify a failure to comply with obliga12 8
tions and time-limits resulting from Community directives."
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

See supra notes 95-107 and accompanying test for a summary of Cassis de Dijon.
Plant Protection Products, 1981 E.C.R. 3277 at 3278.
Id. at 3282.
Id. at 3290-01.
Id. at 3291-92.
Cases 30-34/81, Commission v. Italy, 1981 E.C.R. 3379 [hereinafter Italy

Directives].
124. Id.
125. Id. at 3383-84.
126. Id. at 3384.
127. Id.
128. Id.
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Two aspects of the Italy Directivescase exemplified the growing authority of the EC to issue and enforce environmental regulations. First, Italy
did not challenge the Council's authority to issue environmental regulations, despite the tenuous connection between some of its actions, such as
the regulation of the quality of bathing water, and intra-Community trade.
Second, the court continued to reduce the number of defenses available to
member states for failing to comply with Community environmental directives. This followed the trend established by the court in the Cassis de
Dijon, Detergents and Sulphur Content in Fuels cases. 12 9
3. Waste Oils 1,130 11,131 & 111132 (1983-85)
In contrast to Italy's repeated failures to comply, it was France's attempted
compliance with Community environmental regulations that brought it
before the ECJ. Pursuant to a 1975 Council directive requiring that member states take affirmative measures to ensure the safe disposal of waste
oils, France enacted legislation requiring delivery of such oils to an
"approved collector" for proper disposal. 133 By implication, the legislation
prohibited the export of waste oils to other member states.13 4
The issue in Waste Oils I was referred to the ECJ when the Groupement
d'Interet Economique "Inter-Huiles" argued before a French court that the
legislation constituted an impermissible restriction of trade under article
30 et seq. of the EC Treaty.' 35 The ECJ, reasoning that "the environment is
protected just as effectively when the oils are sold to an authorized disposal
or regenerating undertaking of another member state as when they are disposed of in the Member State of origin," held that France could not organize a system that effectively prohibited the export of waste oils.'

36

In Waste Oils II, the ECJ considered a subsequent argument by the
French government that in practice its legislation did not restrict the export
of waste oils to other member states.' 37 The French government supported
this claim with the fact that France was the leading Community exporter of
waste oils to other member states. 138 The ECJ rejected this defense and
affirmed its holding in Waste Oils I, stating that the French legislation was
impermissible because it would create doubts about an exporter's "legal
129. See supra part IV.A.1-2.
130. Case 172/82, Syndicat National des Fabricants Raffineurs d'Hufle de Graissage
and Others v. Groupement d'Interet Economique "Inter-Huiles" and Others, 1983 E.C.R.
555 [hereinafter Waste Oils f].
131. Case 173/83, Commission v. Fr., 1985 E.C.R. 491 [hereinafter Waste Oils II].
132. Case 240/83, Procureur de la Republique v. Association de Defense des Braleurs
D'huiles Usagees, 1985 E.C.R. 531 [hereinafter Waste Oils III].
133. Waste Oils 1, 1983 E.C.R. at 557-58.

134. Id. at 564.
135. Id. at 564. Of particular relevance was article 34, which prohibits all measures

having an effect equivalent to quantitative restrictions on trade. EC TRATY, supra note
10, art. 34.
136. Waste Oils 1, 1983 E.C.R. at 566.
137. Waste Oils 11, 1985 E.C.R. at 503.

138. Id.
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position" and therefore would have an "inhibitory effect on trade." 13 9
In Waste Oils III, another group opposed to the French system, the
Association de Defense des Braleurs d'Huiles Usages, questioned the
validity of the EC directive. 140 They argued that the directive undermined
the principles of freedom of trade, free movement of goods, and freedom of
competition embodied in the EC Treaty because it empowered member
states to control the movement and disposal of waste oil.141 The ECJ
rejected this argument, stating that "the principle of the freedom of trade is
not to be viewed in absolute terms but is subject to certain limits justified
by the objectives of general interest pursued by the Community. . . ."142
However, the court indicated that any such limits on intra-Community
trade must "neither be discriminatory nor go beyond the inevitable restrictions which are justified by the pursuit- of the objective of environmental
protection."' 43 After characterizing environmental protection as "one of
the Community's essential objectives," the court held that the directive was
44
not "incompatible with the fundamental principles" of the EC Treaty.1
The Waste Oils cases were significant for a number of reasons. The
ECJ effectively extended the "rule of reason" balancing approach by applying it to environmental protection regulations. 145 Together with Cassis de
Dijon, these cases also firmly established that neither a member state law
nor a Community environmental regulation may interfere with intra-Community trade unless three conditions are met: (1) the interference must be
motivated by a legitimate need to protect the environment; 14 6 (2) the interfering regulation must not be discriminatory; 14 7 and (3) the negative effect
on intra-Community trade must not exceed that which is necessary to
achieve the environmental protection objective. 14 8 Finally, by affirming
environmental protection as a fundamental objective of the Community,
the court recognized that environmental protection constitutes a justification for restrictions on the free movement of goods that is separate and
independent of article 36.149
4.

Pesticides (1984)150

Three years after the Plant Protection Products case, the ECJ faced similar
questions in a criminal case again referred to it from a Dutch court.' 5 '
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

Id. at 507.
Waste Oils III, 1985 E.C.R. at 54748.
Id.
Id. at 549.
Id.
Id. at 549-50.
See supra notes 95-107 and accompanying text for a summary of Cassis de Dijon.
E.g., Waste Oils 1, 1983 E.C.R. at 566.
147. Waste Oils III, 1985 E.C.RL at 549.
148. Id.
149. Pascale Kromarek, EnvironmentalProtectionand the Free Movement of Goods: The
Danish Bottles Case, 2J. ENV. L. 89, 101 (1990).

150. Case 94/83, Crim. Proc. against Albert Heijn BV,1984 E.C.R. 3263 [hereinafter
Pesticides].
151. Id.
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The defendant in this case was the owner of a chain of supermarkets that
imported apples from Italy.' 5 2 The apples had a residue of the pesticide
vinchlozoline on them, a substance Dutch law only permits in small quan153
tities on specific fruits and vegetables.
The Dutch government brought criminal charges against the defendant. In his defense, the defendant contended that the Netherlands' prohibition of the marketing of such apples was contrary to article 30 because they
were legally marketed in Italy.' 5 4 The Dutch government responded that
the prohibition was necessary to protect the public health and thus permissible under article 36.155

Concluding that vinchlozoline posed a legitimate health concern, and
that the relevant EC regulations did not address its use, the ECJ ruled that
member states could freely regulate its presence in foodstuffs.15 6 Thus,
despite free trade considerations, the court was unwilling to compel a
member state to allow the importation of a fruit or vegetable tainted with
15 7
the residue of a pesticide not regulated by the Community.
Although the Pesticides case only directly addressed public health, the
court's holding was nevertheless relevant to environmental protection. In
concert with the Plant Protection Products holding, the court's decision
empowered individual member states to invoke the public welfare exceptions to the free trade requirement on the grounds of environmental protection. This exception may even be invoked by one member state when
another has previously waived the same exception, as long as there exists
an arguable threat to the public welfare and the negative impact to free
trade is minimized as much as possible.15 8 However, the Pesticides Court
emphasized that when there is an applicable Community directive, it overrules a member state's authority to invoke this exception.' 5 9
5. Wild Birds 1,160 11,161 & 111162 (1987)
These are only three of a series of cases that arose from the alleged failure
of various member states to comply with a 1979 Council directive intended
152. Id. at 3264.

153. Id. at 3266-67. Interestingly, the apples over which the criminal charges were
brought contained only 1.0 mg/kg of the pesticide, while other fruits, such as strawberries, could legally contain up to 10.0 mg/kg. Id. at 3265-67.
154. Id. at 3277. Although the defendant's argument was addressed by the court as
presented, it is noteworthy that the Italian government submitted a statement indicating
that, in fact, vinchlozoline is not authorized for use on apples in Italy. Id. at 3269.
155. Id. at 3279.
156. Id. at 3280.
157. Id.
158. See supra notes 117-22 and accompanying text for summaries of the Plant Protection Products case. In its 1983 Sandoz decision, the ECJ determined that the burden of
proof in establishing the legitimacy of such a threat lies with the member state invoking
the public welfare exception. Case 174/82, Crim. Proc. Against Sandoz BV, 1983 E.C.R.
2445, 2464.
159. Pesticides, 1984 E.C.R. at 3279-80.
160. Case 247/85, Commission v. BeIg., 1987 E.C.R. 3029 [hereinafter Wild Birds I].
161. Case 262/85, Commission v. Italy, 1987 E.C.R. 3073 [hereinafter Wild Birds 11].
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to protect wild birds. 16 3 The justification for the directive was that "effec-

tive bird protection is typically a transfrontier environment
problem entail16 4
ing common responsibilities for the Member States."
The court focused on two issues in Wild Birds I-the power of member
states to derogate from the 1979 directive and the effectiveness of Belgian
hunting laws in meeting the directive's requirements. 165 In concluding
that Belgium failed to fulfill its Community obligations, the ECJ stated that
although a directive need not be enacted into national law verbatim,
national legislation must ensure "the full application of the directive in a
16 6
sufficiently dear and precise manner."
In Wild Birds II, the Italian government conceded that its extant legislation did not fully comply with the Council's directive, but argued that the
Commission's complaints of noncompliance were unjustified because legislation implementing the directive was under scrutiny by the Italian Parliament. 16 7 The ECJ rejected this defense, stressing the specific failings of the
Italian law in force at that time. 168 In finding that the Italian government
had failed to fulfill its obligations, the court again emphasized the need for
"faithful transposition" of Community law into national law, particularly in
cases when "the management of the common heritage is entrusted to the
169
Member States in their respective territories."
In Wild Birds II, the European Commission charged that the Federal
Republic of Germany had failed to properly modify its national law pursuant to the directive. 170 The Commission complained that while German
law properly allowed an exception to the prohibition against the deliberate
killing of certain birds or the destruction of their nests or eggs for "the
normal use of the land for agricultural, forestry or fishing purposes," it did
not limit this exception to those situations where no other satisfactory
means of protecting these birds existed. 17 1 The German government
responded that its use of the word "deliberate" presupposed that the exception only extended to unintentional acts, and thus fulfilled its obligation
under the directive. 172 The ECJ rejected this argument, finding the German legislation inadequate on the ground that "normal use" of land should
162. Case 412/85, Commission v. F.R.G., 1987 E.C.R. 3503 [hereinafter Wild Birds

IIl].
163. E.g., Wild Birds I, 1987 E.C.R. at 3029. The Council directive required member
states to implement measures designed to protect listed birds from hunting or other
disturbances and to prohibit the sale of those birds, whether alive or dead. Id. at 3030.
Other cases include Case C-339/87, Commission v. Neth., 1990 E.C.R. 1-851 and Case
C-169/89, Crim. Proc. Against Gouretterie Van den Burg, 1990 E.C.R. 1-2143. See infra
notes 214-21 and accompanying text.
164. Wild Birds 1, 1987 E.C.R. at 3059.
165. Id. at 3033.
166. Id. at 3060.
167. Wild Birds II, 1987 E.C.R. at 3077.
168. Id. at 3098-3106.
169. Id. at 3097.
170. Wild Birds I1, 1987 E.C.R at 3506-07.
171. Id. at 3516.
172. Id. at 3517.
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not be equated with unintentional damage to the life and habitat of
birds. 173 In upholding the Commission's complaint, the court found that
174
the German government had "not correctly transposed the directive."
By describing wildlife management as an environmental problem and
upholding each provision of the directive, the ECJ again effectively
endorsed the expansion of the Community's domain over environmental
issues. As in the Italy Directives case, 175 the connection between the regulation of wild birds and intra-Community trade was not readily apparent,
yet none of the defendant states challenged the validity of the directive.
This acquiescence demonstrates the extent to which the authority of the
Community over environmental matters had by then been established.
Furthermore, these cases also demonstrate the high level of scrutiny practiced by the Commission and the court when reviewing the member state's
efforts to incorporate EC environmental directives into their national
legislation.
6.

Groundwater Directive (1987)176

On the same day that the ECJ issued its decision in Wild Birds III, it
decided the Groundwater Directive case. Each of these opinions demonstrated the limited discretion available to member states when implementing Community environmental directives.
In 1979, the Council issued a directive requiring member states to
adopt measures preventing the discharge of certain hazardous substances
into groundwater. 1 77 The Commission brought the Dutch government
before the ECJ for failing to implement the directive into its national law. 17 8
The Netherlands responded that it had expressly implemented part of the
directive and that other legislation effectively implemented much of the
remainder. 1 79 It further argued that it had delayed the full incorporation of
the directive and was redrafting pending legislation in the interest of protecting the public health. 8 0° This redraft, it claimed, was made necessary
by an urgent need to accommodate the remediation of several serious cases
18
of soil contamination.

1

In holding against the Netherlands, the ECJ first concluded that it cannot take account of measures adopted by a member state after commencement of a Community action against it.182 The court reiterated the rule
that verbatim implementation of a directive is unnecessary, but concluded
that a member state cannot meet Community obligations by adopting pro173. Id. at 3517-18.
174. Id. at 3503.
175. See supra part 1V.B.2.
176. Case 291/84, Commission v. Neth., 1987 E.C.R. 3483 [hereinafter Groundwater
Directive].
177. Id. at 3484.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 3486-87.

180. GroundwaterDirectives, 1987 E.C.R. at 3485.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 3498.
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visions so vague that they do not give effect to the directive with sufficient
183
precision or clarity to "satisfy fully the demands of legal certainty."
7. Danish Bottles (1988)184
In 1988, the ECJ decided whether a law passed by a member state for the
purpose of protecting the environment remains valid if the public health is
not threatened, yet the law negatively impacts intra-Community free
trade.18 5 The Danish government had imposed a deposit-and-return system requiring all containers for beer, mineral water, and soft drinks to be
packaged in specific government-approved, reusable containers.' 86 The
Danish government allowed the use of certain non-approved containers,
but only for quantities of less than 3000 hectaliters per year of a product,
and only if the distributor set up an independent deposit-and-return system.18 7 The purpose of the legislation was to protect the environment by
conserving resources and reducing waste.' 8 8
The Commission argued that the Danish system violated the article 30
free trade requirement because it amounted to a quantitative restriction on
trade. 18 9 The Commission reasoned that the system placed an undue burden on importers because compliance required the establishment of an
infrastructure for the collection, sorting, storing, and transport of the containers, as well as other administrative difficulties. 190 In addition, the
Commission argued that the system was contrary to the principle of proportionality and therefore violative of the EC Treaty because a sufficient
level of environmental protection could be achieved by less restrictive
means, such as mandating the recycling of non-reusable containers. 19 1
The Danish government countered that ECJ caselaw called for a balancing of interests and concluded that in this instance the interest in environmental protection outweighed that of free movement of goods. 19 2 The
government calculated that the adverse effects of the Danish system on
intra-Community trade were slight and that the alternative remedies discussed by the Commission would be significantly less effective at protect3
ing the environment. 19
183. Id.
184. Case
Bottles].
185. Id.
186. Id. at
187. Id. at
188. Id. at
189. Id. at
190. Id.
191. Id. at

302/86, Commission v. Den., 1988 E.C.R. 4607 [hereinafter Danish
4608-09.
4609.
4615.
4610.
4610-11. The "principle of proportionality" means that a governmental

action must be both reasonably related and proportional to the public good intended.
The ECJ accepted this principle as an inherent part of EC law in 1970. Case 11/70,
Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v. Einfuhr- Und Vorratsstelle Ffir Getreide Und

Futtermittel, 1970 E.C.R 1125 (commonly referred to as Solange I).
192. Danish Bottles, 1988 E.C.R. at 4614-15. This discussion of a "balancing of inter-

ests" refers to the "rule of reason" approach established in the Cassis de Dijon case. See
supra notes 95-107 and accompanying text for a summary of that case.
193. Danish Bottles, 1988 E.C.R. at 4615-16.
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The ECJ was largely unconvinced by the Danish government's reasoning and determined that the requirement that producers use only approved
containers was "disproportionate to the objective pursued" and therefore
194
unnecessarily disruptive to the article 30 requirement of free trade.
However, the court also concluded that the deposit-and-return aspect of the
Danish system was necessary to achieve the goal of environmental protection and therefore was not disproportionate. 195 Thus, such a deposit-andreturn system would not violate the EC Treaty, even if it adversely effected
intra-Community trade to some degree.
In this case, the ECJ sanctioned interference with intra-Community
trade by a member state for the sole purpose of protecting the environment. 196 However, it also placed limits on that interference. For example,
such interference is not permissible where there is an existing Community
rule relating to the product or activity in question. 197 In addition, by
invoking the principle of proportionality, the ECJ imposed a requirement
that the state's action be proportional to the public good sought to be
achieved. 198 There are two prongs to this proportionality requirement.
First, the negative impact on free trade must be limited to that which is
'"justified by the pursuit of the objective of environmental protection."'20909
Second, the benefits gained must outweigh the adverse effect on trade.
8.

Plastic Bags (1989)201

In the following year, another waste-related case came before the ECJ. An
Italian community, Cinisello Balsamo, prohibited the distribution or sale
of non-biodegradable plastic bags, except for those intended for the collection of waste. 20 2 Several producers of plastic products brought an action
against the municipality, claiming that this prohibition violated Commu20 3
nity law.
The Italian court referred several questions to the ECJ, including

whether member states could prohibit the sale or use of certain waste products in the light of Council directives limiting the disposal of those products. 20 4 In answering these questions, the court focused on the purpose of
194. Id. at 4632.

195. Id. at 4630.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 4629.
198. Id. at 4629.
199. Id. at 4630, citing Case 240/83, Procureur de la Republique v. Association de
Defense des Braleurs D'huiles Usagees (Waste Oils III), 1985 E.C.R. 531, 549.
200. Danish Bottles, 1988 E.C.R. at 4630.
201. Case 380/87, Enichem Base et al. v. Comune di Cinisello Balsamo, 1989 E.C.R.

2491, 2513 [hereinafter Plastic Bags].
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 2513-14. The plaintiffs raised another argument, but it was neither

referred to nor addressed by the ECJ. They argued that the prohibition was not justified
by a need to protect the environment and was therefore violative of the article 30 guarantee of free trade. Id. at 2515-16. The remaining questions were largely procedural and
therefore are not discussed here.
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the directives, rather than their actual language. 20 5 It concluded that the
directives were intended to prevent the production of waste, and that limitations on the sale or use of products such as plastic containers were conducive to the attainment of that goal. 20 6 Therefore, no right to sell or use
such products existed and7 the municipality's prohibition did not violate
20
Community regulations.
The Plastic Bags case demonstrates the court's teleological jurisprudence with respect to such disputes. Rather than taking a formalist or
strict constructionist approach to the interpretation of directives, the ECJ
considered their underlying purpose in rendering a decision. This is characteristic behavior for the ECJ-even when the language of a directive seems
clear, the court still prefers to consider the "spirit, general scheme, and
context of the provision." 20 8 By doing so, the court has vested itself with
the power to mold EC law to satisfy the perceived needs of the Community.
One consequence of this approach is that a directive often has a more comprehensive effect and application than might be suggested by a strict interpretation of its language.
9. The Leybucht Dikes (1989)209
In The Leybucht Dikes case, the ECJ had the opportunity to set forth guidelines for how to proceed when protecting the environment arguably results
in a threat to human safety. 210 However, because the court's review of the
facts indicated that the alleged adverse effect on the environment was negligible, it never truly addressed this important issue.
In 1985, the Federal Republic of Germany approved a project for the
enlargement and strengthening of a dike in the Leybucht, a bay classified
by the government as a "special protection area" because of its importance
2 11
as a "nesting, feeding and staging area for various species of ... birds."
In 1989, the Commission submitted an application to the court requesting
interim measures to suspend this construction. 2 12 The Commission had
concluded that the project violated a Council directive requiring the protection of wild birds. 2 13 The German government acknowledged that the construction might disturb the protected birds, but claimed that a new dike
was vital because the existing dikes were no longer2 14
adequate to protect the
land and its inhabitants from violent storm tides.
205. Id. at 2515.
206. Id.

207. Id. at 2515-16.
208. JoxERRAmoN BENGoErxEA, THE LEGAL REASONING OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OFJusMCE 233 (1993).

209. Case 57/89R, Comnission v. F.I.G., 1989 E.C.R. 2849, 2852 [hereinafter The
Leybucht Dikes].

210. Id.
211. Id. at 2851.
212. Id.

213. Id. at 2850.
214. Id. at 2852.
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In recognition of the fact that the Commission had delayed its application until the project was nearly two-thirds complete, the court focused its
attention only on the forthcoming phase of construction. 2 15 It first considered that the distance between the work area and the breeding area was no
less than it had been during the previously completed work. 2 16 Although
statistics on the Leybucht bird population indicated that it had fallen since
1984, most of this reduction had occurred before the start of the project.2 17 Thus, the court found that there was little evidence to support the

Commission's claim that the final phase would have a significant impact
on the birds. 2 18 The court also rejected a suggestion by the Commission
that the project would indirectly affect the birds by attracting more tour-

ists. 2 19 Therefore, the ECJ concluded that there existed no substantive rea22 0
son to grant the Commission's request for interim measures.

Red Grouse (1990)221
In 1990, a Dutch court referred a question to the ECJ regarding whether
the use of trade measures by one member state in an effort to protect environmental concerns in another member state violates the modified EC
10.

Treaty. 22 2 The court concluded that such measures do indeed violate the
223
Treaty.

The Netherlands Vogelwet (law on birds) protected certain species of
wild birds by prohibiting their possession, sale, transport, import or
export.2 24 These protected species included the red grouse, a bird that2 25
is
plentiful in the United Kingdom but not indigenous to the Netherlands.
The defendant, Van den Burg, was criminally charged
for having imported,
2 26
kept, and sold several specimens of red grouse.
The defendant responded that the Vogelwet's protection of a bird not
found in the Netherlands and lawfully marketed in another member state
(the United Kingdom) violated the free trade provisions of the EC
Treaty. 22 7 The Dutch government argued in turn that bird protection was

necessary for the preservation of Community heritage and was therefore a
228
cross-frontier issue.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.

Id. at 2855.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2855-56.
Id. at 2856.
Id.

221. Case C-169/89, Crim. Proc. against Gourmetterie Van den Burg, 1990 E.C.R. I2143 [hereinafter Red Grouse].

222. Id.
223. Id. at 1-2164.
224. Id. at 1-2146. Even though the Council had previously issued a directive for the
same purpose, the Vogelwet was permissible because the directive allowed member
states to introduce stricter protective measures than provided for under EC regulations.
Id. at 1-2145.
225. Id. at 1-2147.
226. Id. at 1-2146.
227. Id. at 1-2147.
228. Id. at 1-2150.
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Taking into consideration that the red grouse is neither endangered
nor a migratory species protected by Community law, the ECJ agreed with
the defendant. 2 29 The implication of this holding is that in the absence of
a community regulation, one member state may not limit intra-Community
free trade in order to protect an environmental concern in another member
state.
11.

Titanium Dioxide (1991)230

Following the adoption of the Single European Act, there were two primary
EC Treaty articles under which the Council could adopt directives for the
purpose of protecting the environment-articles 100a and 130s.2 3 1 In this
case, the Council had passed a directive intended to harmonize rules
throughout the Community concerning the reduction of pollution caused
by titanium dioxide waste. 23 2 It acted under article 130s, which governed
2 33
environmental legislation and required a unanimous vote for passage.
The Commission asked the ECJ to annul the directive, arguing that the
Council should have acted under article 100a, which addresses matters
concerning the European single market, gives the European Parliament a
stronger role in the passage of legislation, and only requires a qualified

234
majority vote.

The ECJ found the directive to be concerned with both environmental
protection and market harmonization. 23 5 From the language of the Single
European Act, the court then determined that while article 130s was exclusively intended to address environmental protection, article 100a is more
appropriate for the harmonization of environmental regulations. 23 6 Therefore, the court held that the directive should have been based on article
23 7
100a and granted the Commission's request for annulment.
The significance of the Titanium Dioxide case is not simply procedural.
Had the ECJ found that article 130s was the appropriate basis for such a
directive, it would have undermined Parliament's newly elevated role and
238
minimized the democratic component of the EC legislative process.
Instead, the court appeared to give preference to those EC Treaty articles
229. Id. at 1-2164.
230. Case C-300/89, Commission v. Council, 1991 E.C.R. 1-2867, 1-2870 [hereinafter

Titanium Dioxide].
231. See supra notes 62-76 and accompanying text for a discussion of the relevant
sections of the Single European Act.
232. Titanium Dioxide, 1991 E.C.R at 1-2870.
233. Id. See also UsHma, supra note 8, at 71.
234. Titanium Dioxide, 1991 E.C.R. at 1-2871. When adopting the Single European
Act, the member states gave Parliament a stronger legislative voice by introducing a "parliamentary cooperation" procedure which applied to article 100a, but not to article 130.
In Titanium Dioxide, the Council had intentionally circumvented this new procedure by
adopting the directive under article 130s. See BauwN ET Al-, supra note 4, at 84-85.
235. Titanium Dioxide, 1991 E.C.R. at 1-2899.
236. Id. at 1-2901.
237. Id.
238. UsHER, supra note 8, at 71.
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that enhance the democratic role of the Parliament. 2 39 In addition, the
holding established that environmental concerns could be addressed by
the Community even in the absence of a unanimous vote by the member
states because the specific requirements of article 130s do not usurp the
more general requirements of article 100a.
12. Imports of Waste (1992)240
For the purpose of protecting the environment, the Region of Walloonia,
Belgium, adopted a decree prohibiting the import of waste from other
member states or other regions of Belgium. 24 1 The Commission concluded that the decree violated both Council directives concerning the disposal and transport of waste and article 30 et seq. of the EC Treaty ensuring
2 42
the free movement of goods.
In its decision, the ECJ came to several significant conclusions. First,
it found that Council directive 75/442, which sets forth certain requirements concerning the disposal of waste, does not prohibit an absolute ban
on the import of wastes. 243 However, the court did find that directive 84/
631, which is aimed at controlling the transfrontier shipment of hazardous
waste, does prohibit such a ban. 24 4 The court also found that waste,
whether recyclable or not, falls under the aegis of the EC Treaty provisions
on the free movement of goods. 245 Nevertheless, it held that Community
regulations do not prohibit member states from banning the import of
waste when the influx is so great that it constitutes a threat to the
24 6
environment.
In applying these findings to the Walloonia decree, the court found
that because the region has only a limited capacity to handle waste, a genuine threat to the environment existed. 2 47 For this reason, the court held
that the import restriction, although violative of article 30 of the EC Treaty,
was justifiable under the article 36 public welfare exception, except with
respect to hazardous waste. 24 8 Since import regulations on hazardous
materials were controlled by directive, rather than the EC Treaty, the court
found that the article 36 exception did not apply and that
Belgium had
24 9
failed to fulfill its Community obligations in that regard.
The ECJ has been criticized for the Imports of Waste decision because
of its failure to apply the Cassis de Dijon "rule of reason" proportionality
239. Id. at 72.
240. Case C-2/90. Commission v. BeIg., 21 The Proceedings of the Court of Justice
and Court of First Instance of the European Communities 14 (July 9, 1992); also 1
CMLR 365 (1993) [hereinafter Imports of Waste].

241. Id.
242. Id. at 15-16.

243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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approach. 250 Specifically, the argument is that the court, in considering
the Walloon ban, should have weighed the burden on intra-Community
trade against its environmental benefits. 251 Calling this failure a "serious
omission," one commentator emphasized the likelihood that alternatives
existed that would have allowed Walloon to fulfill
its environmental objec25 2
tives while minimizing the burden on trade.
The Imports of Waste case illustrates the primary practical difference
between free trade requirements imposed by the EC Treaty (to which
exceptions are expressly permitted) and obligations imposed by directive.
Specifically, member states are less likely to be exempted from an obligation imposed by a directive. In Carlo Tedeschi v. Denkavit Commerciale, for
example, the ECJ held that member states could not invoke article 36 to
justify a failure to comply with a directive because the Council presumably
considers the public welfare when promulgating directives. 25 3 Likewise, in
Imports of Waste the court accepted Belgium's article 36 public health argument with respect to the EC Treaty's free movement of goods requirement,
but rejected the same argument with respect to the Council directive (i.e.,
the intra-Community movement of hazardous waste). 25 4 This demonstrates the ECJ's recognition that general EC Treaty requirements, which
are necessarily vague, must retain some flexibility in their application,
while directives, which have specific applicability and are intended to harmonize the Community, will only be effective if they bind all member
states equally.
V. The ECJ's Effort at Harmonization
A. The Purpose of Harmonization and the Teleological Approach of the
ECJ
The success of European integration depends to a large extent on the har2 55
monization of those member state laws that affect the common market.

250. Damien Geradin, Free Trade and Environmental Protection in an Integrated Market: A Survey of the Case Law of the United States Supreme Court and the EuropeanCourt of
Justice, 2 J. TRAN SAT'L L. & PoL'y 141, 190 (1993).
251. Id.
252. Id.

253. Case 5/77, Carlo Tedeschi v. Denkavit Commerciale s.r.l., 1977 E.C.R 1555,
1576-77. This dispute involved an alleged violation of a Council directive by the Italian
Government, which had stopped the importation of feeding-stuffs with a potassium

nitrate content exceeding a certain level. The directive fixed maximum permissible levels
of certain substances in feeding-stuffs and prohibited marketing restrictions on them.
Although the court ultimately found that Italy had not violated the directive because the
directive contained a provision allowing member states to adopt temporary provisions to
protect animal or human health, the court remarked that "Where... Community direc-

tives provide for the harmonization of the measures necessary to ensure the protection
of animal and human health. . ., recourse to article 36 is no longer justified." Id.
254. Imports of Waste, 21 The Proceedings of the Court ofJustice and Court of First

Instance of the European Communities, at 15-16.
255. E.g., EC TREAYrv, supra note 10, art. 3g (specifying the establishment of a system
"ensuring that competition in the internal market is not distorted" as an essential Community activity).
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The member states, as a consequence of a natural desire to improve the
welfare of their citizens, regularly promulgate national laws that afford better consumer safety or more effective environmental protection. These
actions are permitted under article 36 of the EC Treaty, but they often
prove to be effective barriers to intra-Community trade when they prevent
the sale of products that do not conform to certain requirements. 25 6 Such
barriers effectively partition the internal market by making it difficult for
manufacturers to market throughout the Community. 25 7 In addition, these
barriers diminish the benefits of free competition. and limit the choices
available to consumers. 2 58 The primary reason that the Community needs
to harmonize certain types of law, then, is to strengthen the internal market
2 59
while protecting the interests of consumers and the general public.
In addition to the concern that disparities in national environmental
laws will weaken the internal market, the EC has provided two other reasons for regulating matters concerning environmental protection. 2 60 First,
because the ultimate goal of the EC Treaty is to improve the living conditions of European citizens, the Community's mission encompasses the protection and improvement of the environment. 2 6 1 Second, because of the
is in the best position to
transborder nature of pollution, the Community
262
effectively solve environmental problems.
The ECJ often molds EC law to satisfy the perceived needs of the Community. 2 63 The court accomplishes this by considering the goal or goals of
each provision in question, as well as considering the context of its application, rather than limiting its interpretation to the provision's explicit language. 26 4 For example, in the Plastic Bags case, the ECJ looked to the
purpose of a directive that facially only applied to waste materials and
determined that it permitted a restriction on the sales of plastic products. 26 5 Similarly, in The Leybucht Dikes the court focused on the potential
impact of a construction project rather than the language of the directive
and therefore refused to stop the project. 266 Occasionally, the court has
256.
257.
258.
259.

BEm~A
Id.
Id.
Id.

er AL., supra note 4, at 428.

260. Stephen C. Dwyer, When May a Member State Impose Environmental Restrictions
Which Are Stricter Than Those Mandated by the European Community?, 17 B.C. INAr'L &
Comp. L. REv. 127, 129-30 (1994).

261. Id.
262. Id.
263. BENGOEIXE, supra note 208, at 98-101.
264. Id. at 233-34. In Defrenne II, a former airline employee brought an employment
discrimination suit under article 119 of the EC Treaty, which guarantees equal pay for

equal work. The court stated that the issue of the provision's direct effect must be interpreted "in light of the principle of equal pay, the aim of this provision and its place in

the scheme of the Treaty." Case 43/75, Defrenne v. Societe Anonyme Belge de Navigation Aerienne Sabena, 1976 E.C.R. 455, 471.
265. See supra notes 201-8 and accompanying text for a summary of the Plastic Bags
case.

266. See supra notes 209-20 and accompanying text for a summary of The Leybucht
Dikes case.
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even ignored the plain language of the EC Treaty to achieve a fundamental
Community purpose. 267 By adopting this malleable approach, which is
referred to as the "teleological method of interpretation," 268 the ECJ has
been able to expand its role by engaging in a significant amount of judicial
26 9
activism and reshaping Community law into a more coherent body.
The teleological method of interpretation is the primary means by
which the ECJ has attempted to harmonize Community environmental law.
Initially, the court paved the way for harmonization by using this method
to impose a general requirement that the member states recognize each
other's laws. 2 70 Later the ECJ acquired jurisdiction over environmental
matters and expanded that jurisdiction. 27 1 Since then, the court has
attempted to balance competing interests such as intra-Community trade
and environmental protection, and member state sovereignty and harmonization of EC environmental law. 27 2 In the sections that follow, these steps
will be addressed in turn. This Note concludes with an assessment of the
reasons as to why the ECJ's goal of environmental harmonization has not
yet been fully realized.
B.

The Concept of Mutual Recognition

The Community's initial method of harmonizing Community law was to
2 73
create uniform legislation through its regular legislative process.
Because this proved to be unacceptably slow, the ECJ took the initiative in
the 1979 Cassis de Dijon case and adopted a new approach. 2 74 Through an
approach to harmonization known as "mutual recognition," the court effectively required that the member states give recognition to each other's
national laws affecting the internal market. 2 75 It accomplished this by
invoking the article 30 requirement of free trade to require that goods and
services legally produced in one member state be authorized for sale or use
in all other member states. 276 However, because the ECJ has allowed
exceptions for mandatory requirements such as protection of the environment and the defense of the consumer, its new approach is not one of
"pure" mutual recognition.2 7 7
There have been, or will be, several consequences to the ECJ's use of
the teleological method of mutual recognition. One is that the amount of
267. HARTLEY, supra note 17, at 86.
268. Id. at 85. Rather than limiting its role to "interpretation," however, the court's

approach is perhaps more accurately described as "decision-making on the basis ofjudicial policy." Id.
269. BENGOMXEA, supra note 208, at 234.

270. See infra notes 273-79 and accompanying text.
271. See infra notes 280-91 and accompanying text.
272. See infra notes 292-324 and accompanying text.
273. E.g., Gerard Hertig, Imperfect Mutual Recognition for EC Financial Services, 14
IN'L REv. L. & ECON. 177, 177-78 (1994).

274. Id.
275. Cassisde Dijon, 1979 E.C.R. at 662. See also supranotes 95-107 and accompanying text for a summary of the Cassis de Dijon case.
276. Id.

277. E.g., Hertig, supra note 273, at 177-78.
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legislation at the Community level will probably decrease, yet the national
laws of the member states will not threaten the establishment of the internal market as much as they might in the absence of the teleological
method. 278 Another is that subsequent Community legislation has incorporated the concept of mutual recognition, and the EC need now only harmonize the base-level requirements for goods and services marketed
'throughout the Community. 27 9 Finally, it paved the way for harmonization of environmental laws.
C. Establishment of the Community's Jurisdiction Over Environmental
Matters
The Community's claim to competence over environmental matters was
largely motivated in its early stages by a need to remove nontariff barriers
to intra-Community trade. 28 0 Thus, in the 1970s the environmental movement within the EC was rooted within the purposes of the EC Treaty, the
regulation of trade and competition, rather than being grounded directly in
28
a policy intended to protect the environment. '
When this tenuous posture was challenged by the Italian government
in the Detergents and Sulphur Content of Fuels cases, the ECJ nevertheless
upheld the Community's jurisdiction over environmental matters. 28 2 The
ECJ applied the teleological method to article 100's harmonization requirement in order to mate environmental regulation to the fundamental Community principle of promoting fair market competition between member
283
states.
The Detergentsand Sulphur Content of Fuels cases concerned instances
of transboundary pollution. However, by substantiating the existence of a
symbiotic relationship between trade and the environment, the court effectively created the foundation for the establishment of the Community's
competence over most environmentally-related activities, not just those
having cross-border effects. Although the Community initially found it difficult to justify an environmental policy absent a demonstrable effect on
intra-Community trade, the barriers to such policies eventually collapsed.2 8 4 For example, subsequent Council directives concerning the
quality of bathing water2 85 and the protection of wildlife28 6 survived the
278. Koen Lenaerts, The Principleof Subsidiarity and the Environment in the European
Union: Keeping the Balance of Federalism, 17 FoR HAm INT'L L.J. 846, 857-58 (1994).
279. Id. Under the amended EC Treaty, the base-levels in the fields of health, safety,
environmental protection, and consumer protection are required to provide a "high level
of protection." EC TRiATY, supra note 10, art. 100a(3) (as amended 1987).
280. Phillippe Sands, European Community Environmental Law: The Evolution of a
Regional Regime of International Environmental Protection, 100 YALE LJ. 2511, 2513
(1991).

281. Id.
282. See supra notes 108-16 and accompanying text for a summary of the Detergents
and Sulphur Content of Fuels cases.
283. Detergents, 1980 E.C.R. at 1106; Sulphur Content of Fuels, 1980 E.C.R. at 1122.
284. Feeley & Gilhuly, supra note 21, at 679.
285. See Italy Directives, supra notes 123-29 and accompanying text.
286. See Wild Birds, supra notes 160-75 and accompanying text.
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court's scrutiny as falling within the aegis of the Community's jurisdiction
over environmental matters even though the relationship between these
activities and transborder environmental effects or trade is not readily
apparent. By the mid-1980s, there were virtually no jurisdictional limitations on the Council's ability to issue directives concerning environmental
28 7
matters.
Environmental protection provides perhaps the best example of the
potential effects of the court's teleological method and its policy of increasing the scope and effectiveness of Community law. The EC Treaty originally contained no reference to the environment or its protection.
Nevertheless, the court definitively expanded the Community's sphere of
influence to encompass such matters. 288 Once the blessing of the ECJ was
given, the Community "effectively bootstrapped an environmental policy
2 89
from an economic foundation."
The establishment of the Community's competence over environmental matters was only the second step in the harmonization process. The
Community adopted environmental protection as a fundamental interest
290
and superimposed it over previously established economic interests.
Because the environmental interest fell outside the framework of the EC
Treaty before it was amended in 1987, it was not initially clear how the
tension between the competing interests and sovereigns would be
resolved. 29 ' As will be demonstrated, it fell to the ECJ to strike the necessary balance.
D. Balancing the Tension Between Trade, Sovereignty, and
Environmental Protection.
The next steps in the process of harmonization are to implement a uniform
set of environmental regulations throughout the Community and to
enforce them in a uniform fashion. For a variety of reasons, these steps
have not yet been completed. One reason stems from the federal structure
of the EC and the need to balance the interests of competing sovereigns.
Another stems from the inherent tension between two of the essential functions of the Community-economic maximization and environmental
protection.
The EC uses the directive as its principal legislative form in substantive matters. 29 2 Nearly all environmental actions by the Community have
been imposed by directive. Although a directive mandates the achievement
of a result, it leaves the form and method of achievement to the member
states. 29 3 Thus, the main role of implementing and enforcing environmental directives falls upon the individual member states, rather than the Com287. Feeley & Gilhuly, supra note 21, at 679.
288. Detergents, 1980 E.C.R. at 1106; Sulphur Content of Fuels, 1980 E.C.R. at 1122.
289. Demiray, supra note 3, at 300.
290. Id.

291. Id. at 298-300.
292. See, e.g., Feeley & Gilhuly, supra note 21, at 677-78.

293. Id.
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munity. The Community's role in the process is to formulate policy and
oversee compliance with directives. 2 94 In the absence of an overriding
Community regulation, the member states are free to promulgate their own
environmental regulations, as long as they comply with other elements of
the EC Treaty. Most of the environmental cases that are brought before the
ECJ deal either with the promulgation or proper implementation of environmental directives, or with actions by a member state that are intended
to protect the environment but allegedly impose an impermissible burden
on intra-Community trade.
1. Independent Actions by Member States
Despite the successes of the Community in establishing the concept of
mutual recognition and in obtaining competence over environmental matters, its environmental policy is relatively limited in scope and the member
states retain considerable influence over such matters. 295 Indeed, some
member states, particularly Denmark and Germany, continue to pursue
independent environmental protection programs without waiting for direction from the Community.2 96 Such actions periodically interfere with the
economic objectives of the EC Treaty. Conversely, economically-motivated
or public welfare-motivated actions by the member states periodically
impinge on the environmental requirements imposed by the Community.
In such instances, the ECJ must balance these competing interests while
continuing the movement toward harmonization.
Following Cassis de Dijon,2 97 a stronger indication of the ECJ's policy
concerning the concept of mutual recognition and a member state's freedom to impinge on the free market came in the Plant ProtectionProducts29 8

and Pesticides2 99 cases. In each of these, the ECJ allowed a member state to
require separate approval of products already approved for use in another
member state if the requirement was imposed for the purpose of protecting
the public health. The ECJ adopted the position that in the absence of a
Community effort at harmonization, legitimate public welfare concerns
outweigh a negative impact on intra-Community trade, even if there is
strong evidence that these concerns are unfounded. 300
In Danish Bottles, the ECJ augmented the policy it adopted in the Plant
ProtectionProductsand Pesticide cases.30 1 It did this in two ways-by explic294. Id. at 678-79.
295. Demiray, supra note 3, at 303.
296. Id.

297. See supra notes 95-107 and accompanying text for a summary of Cassis de Dion.
298. See supranotes 117-22 and accompanying text for a summary of the PlantProtection Products case.
299. See supra notes 150-59 and accompanying text for a summary of the Pesticides
case.

300. E.g., Pesticides, 1984 E.C.R. at 3266-67 (the concentration of the pesticide on the
apples over which the Dutch government brought criminal charges was so low (1.0 mg/

kg) that strawberries sold in the Netherlands could legally contain up to ten times as
much without being considered a public health risk).
301. See supra notes 184-200 and accompanying text for a summary of the Danish
Bottles case.
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itly applying that policy to an environmental protection case and by developing a test to determine when member states might lawfully invoke the
exception to the requirement of mutual recognition, or otherwise burden
intra-Community free trade. 30 2 Specifically, the court established that
such burdens are permitted only in the absence of a harmonizing rule
when the negative impact on trade is both minimized and outweighed by
the benefit gained. 30 3 In addition to providing some guidance to the member states, the purpose of the test was to maximize the total benefit-either
economic or environmental-to the Community without any apparent preference concerning the nature of that benefit.
Although the ECJ's position in these two cases favors the maximization of the benefit to the Community as a whole, it also strengthens the
power of the member states to enact environmental policies that restrict
the internal market. On its face, this appears to contradict the court's fundamental policies of enlarging the Community's power and encouraging
harmonization of Community regulations. However, in each case, the
court emphasized that its holding applied only in the absence of applicable
Community law.30 4 Therefore, it is likely that the court intended to spur
the Community into enacting more stringent and comprehensive environmental regulations, rather than empower member states with the ability to
30 5
circumvent the Community's fundamental economic objectives.
As a consequence of this balancing approach, the ECJ has not provided bright-line rules, but rather vague guidelines, 30 6 and it will still be
necessary for the court to proceed on a case-by-case basis. Although the
protection of the public health is clearly an overriding concern of the ECJ,
it is not yet particularly dear how far the court will go in allowing member
states to burden intra-Community trade for the purpose of protecting the
environment in the absence of Community regulations.
2. The Promulgation and Implementation of Council Directives
Following the establishment of the Community's competence over environmental matters in the Detergent and Sulphur Content of Fuels cases, 30 7 the
ECJ addressed the implementation of Council directives relating to environmental protection in Italy Directives.30 8 In that instance, the ECJ simply enforced its policy of strengthening the Community's power by
rejecting the Italian government's defense that implementation of a series
of directives had been delayed by complications inherent to its legislative
9
process. 30
302. See supra notes 194-200 and accompanying text.
303. Danish Bottles, 1988 E.C.R. at 4629-30.
304. E.g., Danish Bottles, 1988 E.C.R. at 4629.

305. Schemmel & de Regt, supra note 43, at 78.
306. Demiray, supra note 3, at 318.
307. See supra notes 108-16 and accompanying text for a summary of those cases.
308. See supra notes 123-29 and accompanying text for a summary of the Italy Directives case.
309. Italy Directives, 1981 E.C.R. at 3384.
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The court's holdings in Waste Oils I and Waste Oils II, on the other
hand, dealt with the proper implementation of an environmental directive,
rather than with a failure to implement one. 3 10 In Waste Oils I, the ECJ
affirmed the Community's need to protect the environment but warned
that this need "does not automatically authorize the... Member States to
establish barriers to exports."3 11 Instead, the court, applying its teleological jurisprudence, looked to the purpose of the directive and determined
that the Council did not intend for it to result in the creation of such barriers. 3 12 In addition, the court suggested that because a burden on free trade
was unnecessary to achieve the objectives of the directive, any such burden
was impermissible. 3 13 Thus, the court appeared to indicate that a burden
on trade for the purpose of protecting the environment, even under the
guise of a Council directive, would be permissible only if it was both necessary and in concert with the Council's intent.
The court's decisions in the first two Waste Oils cases, while requiring
the minimization of the burden on free trade, avoided the more specific
and difficult question of how to balance the Community's competing interests of trade and the environment. In Cassis de Dijon, the court, by adopting the "rule of reason" approach, had established the necessary framework
for balancing such interests. 3 14 The court's first application of this framework to a Community environmental action came in Waste Oils III, where a
private party argued that a Council directive allowing member states to
control the movement and disposal of waste oil contravened the economic
and free trade principles of the EC Treaty. 3 15 The ECJ, in upholding the

validity of the directive, indicated that it would permit restrictions on intraCommunity trade that are not discriminatory, do not extend "beyond the
inevitable restrictions ... justified by the pursuit of the objective of envi-

ronmental protection," 3 16 and are proportional to the goal sought. 3 17
The adoption of a balancing approach to resolve the inherent tension
between environmental protection and economic interests had several
implications. Most importantly, it unequivocally established that the ECJ,
through the application of its own jurisprudence, raised environmental
protection to the same level of significance in the Community as the fundamental economic objectives upon which the EC Treaty was founded. This,
in turn, enlarged the powers of the Community to encompass social matters outside of the scope of the EC Treaty and allowed it to continue moving unimpeded towards the objective of harmonizing environmental
regulations within each of the member states.
The ECJ's push for harmonization is also illustrated in the Wild Birds
310. See supra notes 130-39 and accompanying text for a summary of these cases.
311. Case 172/82, Waste Oils 1, 1983 E.C.R. 555, 565-66.
312. Id. at 566.
313. Id.
314. See supra notes 99-100 and accompanying text.
315. See supra notes 14044 and accompanying text for a summary of Waste Oils I1.
See also Demiray, supra note 3, at 306-08, for a discussion of this case.
316. Case 240/83, Waste Oils III, 1985 E.C.R. 531, 549.
317. Demiray, supra note 3, at 308.
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cases, 3 18 Groundwater Directive,3 19 and Imports of Waste,3 20 which all
demonstrate the reluctance of the court to grant the member states any
flexibility with regard to the full application of Community environmental
directives. These cases demonstrate that when the Council has already balanced the appropriate considerations during the course of promulgating a
directive, 3 2 1 member states have almost no freedom either to deviate from
the directive's requirements 32 2 or to delay its implementation. 3 23 Such
inflexibility on the part of the ECJ is essential to the harmonization process -it maintains the integrity of the Community's environmental program
and prevents the fragmentation of the internal market that could result
from uncoordinated environmental protection efforts by the member
states. 3 24 Thus, the court's strict position concerning the implementation

of environmental directives by member states appears to have its foundation, at least in part, in its general goal of strengthening the Community.
3. Summary of the ECJ's Balancing Approach
Pursuant to its goal of promoting European integration, the ECJ has used
the teleological method to elevate the legal status of environmental protection within the Community and has since attempted to harmonize Community environmental legislation while balancing several competing interests.
The court has implicitly or explicitly formulated several rules to guide this
balancing. In the absence of a Community regulation, member states may
restrict trade out of concern for the public health. However, such restrictions are only permissible for the purpose of protecting the environment if
the benefit outweighs the cost. If a Community regulation exists, the ECJ
requires that both the directive and the member state's mode of implementation be non-discriminatory, proportional to the good sought to be
achieved, and narrowly tailored. In addition, each member state must
implement directives within a reasonable time and in such a manner as to
give them full effect, while minimizing the burden on intra-Community
trade.

318. See supra notes 160-75 and accompanying text for summaries of the Wild Birds
cases.
319. See supra notes 176-83 and accompanying text for a summary of the Groundwater Directives case.
320. See supra notes 240-54 and accompanying text for a summary of the Imports of
Waste case.
321. E.g., Wild Birds 1, 1987 E.C.1R at 3060.
322. Id. The only exception, which the court applied in the Imports of Waste case, is
that member states may deviate from the requirements of a directive if compliance

would result in a genuine threat to the public well-being. Imports of Waste, supra notes
240-54 and accompanying text.
323. See Wild Birds II, supra notes 167-69 and accompanying text; Italy Directives,
supra notes 123-29 and accompanying text; Groundwater Directive, supra notes 176-83

and accompanying text.
324. E.g., BEaum4 Er AL., supra note 4, at 1102.
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The Efficacy of the ECJ's Effort to Harmonize Community
Environmental Law

Despite the ECJ's efforts to harmonize the member state's environmental
laws, and even though the EC has greatly influenced environmental matters within its confines, there is not yet any significant degree of Community-wide uniformity with respect to environmental regulation. There are
three primary reasons that the goal of harmonization has proven to be
elusive.
The first reason stems from the fact that most of the environmental
legislation in the EC is passed in the form of directives, which leave the
manner of implementation to the discretion of the individual member
state. Although the ECJ has recently made an effort to police the implementation process, the member states often either manipulate directives'
requirements to suit their individual needs or delay the process of implementation altogether. 325 This leads to functional differences in the regulation of environmental matters between member states and reduces the
degree of harmonization. 3 26 For example, most well-developed countries,
such as Germany and the Netherlands, have already implemented strict
environmental standards pursuant to Community directives and assumed
the concomitant economic burdens. 32 7 However, some of the less-developed southern countries, such as Portugal and Greece, have delayed implementation of these directives in order to give their industries a competitive
3 28
edge.
Another primary reason for the EC's failure to harmonize Community
environmental law is that it has been relatively unsuccessful in monitoring
member state enforcement of their implementing national laws.3 2 9 Each
individual state is responsible for the enforcement of the statutes it adopts
pursuant to EC directives. While the Community has some legal authority
to regulate the enforcement of these statutes, it suffers from a lack of
resources to devote to the effort. 3 30 Therefore, not only can implementing
325. Visek, supra note 11, at 394; Harms, supra note 57, at 410-11. Although article

171 of the TEU now empowers the ECJ to impose fines on member states for failure to
comply with Community law, the court must go through a prohibitively long and com-

plex procedure before it can take such an action. E.g., ClionaJ.M. Kimber, A Comparison of Environmental Federalism in the United States and the European Union, 54 MD. L.
REv. 1658, 1680 (1995). For this reason, perhaps, the court has never imposed a fine on
any of the member states, despite the fact that they routinely fail to transpose environmental directives into national law in a timely manner. Visek, supra note 11, at 394.
326. Harms, supra note 57, at 410-11.

327. Id.
328. Id.
329. Visek, supra note 11, at 399; Feeley & Gilhuly, supra note 21, at 671. It is note-

worthy that the ECJ has never decided a case dealing with a member state's failure to
adequately enforce a national statute adopted pursuant to an environmentally-related
Council directive.
330. Feeley & Gilhuly, supra note 21, at 671. In 1990, the Council created the European Environmental Agency. This agency is charged with gathering available data and
analyzing the extent to which the member states are complying with EC environmental
regulations. However, it lacks the power to enforce regulations or even to actively investigate suspected violations. Kimber, supra note 316, at 1684.
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statutes vary between countries, but so can the degree to which they are
331
enforced.
The final reason behind the EC's failure to harmonize the Community's environmental legislation is that it has failed to establish an overarching substantive methodology-it merely reacts to events rather than
creating a framework with which to predict them.3 32 Neither the ECJ's

caselaw, which is limited in volume and vague in content, nor the amended
EC Treaty provides unequivocal substantive guidance for the proper balancing of the Community's competing interests and goals. 33 3 The ECJ's

affinity for balancing stems from a desire to maximize the total benefit to
the Community and retain some flexibility for the court; however, balancing methods are inherently vague. 33 4 As a consequence, in the absence of
a specific Council directive, the member states are given inadequate guidance concerning the regulation of environmental matters.
Thus, while the ECJ continues to base its decisions in policies that
promote European integration, such as harmonization, member states
largely remain free to enforce EC environmental law in any manner of their
choosing.3 35 One reason for this stems from the EC's past failure-and the
European Union's continuing failure-to provide unambiguous substantive
guidance to the member states concerning how to balance the Community's competing interests of environmental protection and economic maximization.3 36 Another reason stems from the unfortunate reality that the
Community's executive and judicial branches do not yet have effective
3 37
monitoring and enforcement mechanisms at their command.
Conclusion
Many of the actions of the European Court ofJustice relevant to the evolution of the Community's environmental policy can best be explained in
light of the court's fundamental goals of strengthening the Community and
promoting European integration. The European Community quickly realized the need to harmonize certain subsidiary social matters, particularly
environmental regulation, in order to protect the internal market by
preventing disparate burdens on intra-Community trade. When the Community legislative process proved too sluggish, the judges of the ECJ, initially charged only with protecting the fundamental economic objectives of
331. Id. Compounding the problem is the fact that some of the member states do not
have the resources to fully implement and enforce Community law. The EU is making
some effort to provide financial assistance to those countries, but the problem may
become exacerbated if Eastern European countries become member states. Visek, supra
note 11, at 400.
332. Demiray, supra note 3, at 296.
333. Id.
334. E.g., Danish Bottles, 1988 E.C.RL at 4630 (imposing the nebulous requirement
that the environmental benefits gained by a member state's action must outweigh the
adverse effect on trade).
335. Feeley & Gilhuly, supra note 21, at 671.
336. Demiray, supra note 3, at 296.
337. Kimber, supra note 325, at 1678-85.
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the EC Treaty, used the teleological method to bootstrap competence over
environmental matters as well. By adopting this teleological approach, the
court vested itself with the power to mold the law to satisfy the perceived
needs of the Community. Rather than merely interpreting EC law, the
judges of the court became policymakers as well.
Within only a few years, the Council and court, working in concert,
constructed a sound procedural mechanism for addressing environmental
concerns. Nevertheless, in the absence of unequivocal substantive guidance from the newly-formed European Union coupled with an adequate
enforcement mechanism, the Community's intertwined goals of a successful internal market and an effective, uniform level of environmental protection will remain elusive.

